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Introduction
More than two thousand years ago, Cicero in "de o¢ ciis" constructed cases of contracting parties who had struck a deal under asymmetric information prior to sale. If Rhodos is su¤ering from a famine and a seller is shipping crop to Rhodos, does he report of other boats approaching with crop or does he remain silent in order to obtain a higher price? Or if a seller sells gold but thinks he sells brass, does the buyer tell him or does he silently buy gold at the price of brass? Ever since Cicero, legal scholars have kept debating about circumstances when such contracts should be enforced and when not.
Mistake is accepted as a valid formation defense in many legal systems.
In addition to general rules from contract law, legal systems may provide remedies that are speci…c for transactions on markets for equity or insurance contracts and may impose duties to disclose explicitly. Kronman (1978) was among the …rst to approach the issue from a law and economics perspective. His analysis departs from an apparent inconsistency in contract law. On the one hand, there exist contract cases where a promisor, due to unilateral mistake, is excused from performance. On the other hand, there also exist cases where a party is entitled to withhold information. To resolve the issue, he proposes the following theory. The law tends to recognize a right to deal with others without disclosing what he knows provided that the information is the result of a deliberate and costly search. Such a right, however, is not recognized where the information has casually been acquired. Shavell (1994) , being stimulated by Kronman's article, introduced a formal model to explore a closely related issue in greater depth and in line with insights from information economics. He compares the incentives to acquire information prior to sale under mandatory disclosure versus voluntary disclosure. Voluntary disclosure is meant to capture those cases where the informed party has the right to deal without disclosing. Mandatory disclosure, in contrast, may re ‡ect these other cases where the informed party will e¤ectively be led to disclose as, otherwise, her partner may be excused from performance or she would face other severe sanctions. Shavell's main conclusions are as follows. Voluntary disclosure generates excessive incentives (relative to …rst best) for acquiring information. Mandatory disclosure is socially desirable for sellers whereas, for buyers, the right to deal without disclosing may be required to spur acquisition of socially desirable information.
The present paper considers a more general but still related model. Nonetheless, rather di¤erent conclusions emerge from my analysis. Voluntary disclosure need not generate excessive incentives to acquire information. Voluntary disclosure may result in even lower incentives than mandatory disclosure.
Incentives to acquire information under mandatory disclosure remain insuf…cient quite generally.
Shavell's …ndings rest on the assumptions that the party who may acquire information has encompassing bargaining power. She can unilaterally propose the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) basis to the buyer. Moreover, the parameters of his model are chosen such that the buyer is commonly known to value the good higher than the seller (trivial trade decision).
In a regime of voluntary disclosure, bargaining takes place under asymmetric information. The TIOLI-assumption may be convenient as it simpli…es the analysis of the underlying bargaining game. Yet, in many situations, the assumption of one party being endowed with encompassing bargaining power simply does not …t. For that reason, the present paper allows for bargaining procedures where both parties may have positive bargaining power.
In contrast to the related literature, however, I do not solve any speci…c bargaining game explicitly. Rather, the analysis makes use of properties of payo¤s only that are shared by the equilibrium outcome of various bargaining procedures. Voluntary participation, in particular, is common to all such procedures and, hence, equilibrium payo¤s must satisfy corresponding participation constraints. Moreover, the party that has obtained information may always disclose it prior to negotiations voluntarily. By doing so, she may unilaterally change the informational setting under which negotiations take place. As a consequence, her equilibrium payo¤s must satisfy corresponding disclosure constraints.
At one point of the analysis (see section 6 below), use of incentive constraints will be made. Again, equilibrium payo¤s of the party that may acquire information will satisfy such constraints quite generally.
The analysis of the present paper concentrates on equilibrium payo¤s and makes exclusive use of the above constraints such that the exact speci…cation of the bargaining procedure and the explicit calculation of its equilibria under asymmetric information can be dispensed with. Therefore the results will hold no matter whether the bargaining is of TIOLI-nature or not and they include non-trivial trade decisions. In fact, particular attention will be paid to cases where, in the absence of information, it would be best to renounce a deal.
In some aspects, my setting may be reminiscent of the hold-up literature as pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) . In that literature, renegotiations take place under contracts that, for reasons whatsoever, fail being complete.
In my setting, incompleteness arises as parties meet and start negotiations only after one of them may have covertly acquired information. Whether, at that point, disclosing information prior to negotiations is mandatory or remains voluntary has been decided by others (law or courts).
In general, the simple dichotomous choice between mandatory and voluntary disclosure remains too crude an instrument to implement the …rst best solution. But the choice a¤ects the incentives to acquire information nonetheless. I follow Shavell (1994) by comparing the incentives to acquire information under mandatory versus voluntary disclosure and relative to …rst best.
I also follow Shavell by assuming that asymmetric information is of exogenous nature. Other boats with crop may or may not approach Rhodos, a piece of land may or may not contain an oil well, the real estate value of a company going public may be unknown to the company itself, or the true risk of a …nancial asset may remain uncertain for both the seller and the buyer. Under exogenous asymmetric information, the information status of the possibly informed party may also be subject to asymmetric information. Along these lines, Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) and Shavell (1994) have studied negotiations under exogenously given asymmetric information where one of the parties may acquire information prior to sale. This is in contrast to endogenous asymmetric information due to the fact that, prior to negotiations, one of the parties has covertly invested to a¤ect the possible gain of the relationship. Notice, under endogenous asymmetric information and in contrast to exogenous asymmetric information, one of the parties is always commonly known to be fully informed. Gul (2001) , Lau (2007) and Hermalin (2013) have examined negotiations among two parties under endogenous asymmetric information in the above sense. Among these studies, Lau is the only one to allow for acquisition of information by the uninformed party. On this account, I follow her by imposing the same acquisition technology: the party acquiring information decides on the probability of learning the true move of nature where a higher probability causes higher costs. Lau, however, does not compare incentives to acquire information under mandatory versus voluntary disclosure.
In a setting of exogenous asymmetric information, Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) provide such a comparison in a reduced-form game that is consistent with a game in which the …rm is a monopoly price-setter. Their acquisition technology, however, deviates from the one studied by Lau and the present paper. Acquisition is assumed free of cost and a …rm which decides to test learns the quality of the product for sure.
The literature quoted above has in common that explicit bargaining essentially of TIOLI-nature only is considered. While many papers deal with one-stage TIOLI, Gul (2001) and Lau (2007) also explore the case where one party makes an o¤er of the TIOLI-type repeatedly.
The present paper examines incentives to acquire information of exogenous nature under mandatory versus voluntary disclosure without TIOLIassumption. It is organized as follows. In section 2, the general setting is introduced and, as a reference point, the …rst best solution is discussed. For illustration, an underlying allocation problem is spelled out. All results, however, will hold beyond this allocation problem as proofs do not refer to this underlying speci…cation. Section 3 deals with the legal regime where mandatory disclosure is e¤ec-tively imposed such that negotiations take place under symmetric information: either both parties or none of them know the move of nature. Unless the party that may acquire information enjoys encompassing bargaining power, incentives to acquire information remain insu¢ cient (relative to …rst best) under mandatory disclosure quite generally. Notice, the assumption needed for this general result would certainly be met if the party who may acquire information can propose the contractual terms on TIOLI-basis. At lesser bargaining power, however, the incentives to ac-quire information may compare quite di¤erently as is shown in the next two sections where I distinguish sel…sh from cooperative acquisition and deal with cases where, in the absence of information, the deal should not be struck.
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In section 5 on sel…sh acquisition, incentives to acquire information are shown to be insu¢ cient even under voluntary disclosure whereas, in section 6 on cooperative acquisition, incentives under voluntary disclosure are shown to be lower even if compared with mandatory disclosure. Section 7 concludes. For illustration and to justify the constraints on equilibrium payo¤s that were imposed, one way of deriving equilibrium payo¤s from a given bargaining game is spelled out in the appendix explicitly.
First best solution
The general setting is as follows. Two risk-neutral parties A (she) and B (he) meet to negotiate a contract. The joint surplus of their relationship may remain uncertain. Uncertainty is captured by a random move ! of nature from the outcome space . This outcome space is endowed with a probability measure in the sense that, for any event 0 , the function ( 0 ) denotes the probability of this event.
The reservation payo¤s (outside option) of party A and B are denoted as u(!) and v(!), respectively, and may depend on the move of nature.
If the move ! of nature is known then the maximum surplus of the relationship amounts to (!), if not the expected maximum surplus amounts 0 . It seems natural to assume that the inequalities
hold in expected terms.
For the following speci…cation of the underlying allocation problem, in fact, (1) can even be proven to hold. Think of a buyer-seller or buyerproducer relationship facing some decision q from a given set Q of alternatives, including the outside option q = o. The payo¤s of A and B (not including transfer payments) amount to A(!; q) and B(!; q), respectively, social surplus to S(!; q) = A(!; q) + B(!; q). Uncertainty may concern all of these payo¤s, including the reservation payo¤s u(!) = A(!; o) and
Alternatively, the decision q may have to be taken by the buyer after having bought an indivisible good from the seller. This version of the allocation problem has been studied by Shavell (1994) and by Hermalin (2013) .
The set Q of alternative decisions may even be multi-dimensional, allowing to distinguish trade according to the time when agreement was reached.
For such a speci…cation, if ! is known then the maximum surplus amounts
whereas, if the move of nature remains uncertain, the maximum expected surplus is equal to
With such a speci…cation of the allocation problem, the constraints (1) would obviously be met. The analysis does not refer to any speci…c allocation problem but, instead, will make use of properties (1) only.
Prior to negotiations, one of the two parties (party A by convention) may invest to acquire information. I use the same acquisition technology as Lau (2008) . Accordingly, party A's investment decision x 2 [0; 1] concerns the probability of learning the true move of nature. With probability 1 x, she learns nothing. To be informed with probability x causes costs k(x) that must be borne by her. Investments take place before the two parties meet.
At the negotiation stage, investment costs are sunk.
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The …rst best solution requires investments
that maximize expected welfare w(x): Expected welfare (net of search costs) amounts to
2 Notice, in Shavell (1994) , parties di¤er in their exogenously given costs of being in-
formed. The present model, in contrast, introduces the probability of being informed as a decision variable such that the incentives to be informed can be explored. Yet, the di¤er-ence in modelling is rather a matter of taste than of substance. Under both approaches, it is the value of being informed only that matters.
where
denotes the social gain from being informed. By assumption (1), this gain can never be negative and it will be strictly positive whenever the information has social value.
After having described the …rst best solution, the remaining sections deal with deriving and comparing the incentives to acquire information under rules of mandatory versus voluntary disclosure as well as relative to this …rst best solution.
Mandatory disclosure
In the present setting, the two parties are assumed to negotiate while being symmetrically informed. At the time of contracting, party A's acquisition e¤ort is sunk and either A knows the true move of nature or she does not.
By assumption, if A knows it to be ! then, under mandatory disclosure, she meets her duty to disclose ! truthfully (to avoid severe sanctions).
If, however, A does not know the true move she cannot disclose and has to remain silent. In this case, under mandatory disclosure, party B is aware of the fact that party A herself does neither know the move of nature.
Therefore, in either case, bargaining takes place among symmetrically informed parties if information sharing is governed by e¤ective mandatory disclosure.
The bargaining game will not be speci…ed explicitly. Rather, the analysis directly refers to the equilibrium payo¤s. If parties A and B know ! to be the true move of nature, their equilibrium payo¤s are denoted by (!) and (!) whereas, if they do not know it, their expected payo¤s are denoted by a 0 and 0 , respectively.
As each party may unilaterally enforce the outside option, the participation constraints
must hold for any move ! that is known whereas the participation constraints
must hold in expected terms if the move of nature remains unknown. These participation constraints concern symmetrically informed parties.
As long as parties negotiate under symmetric information, I assume the Coase Theorem to be valid in the sense that
holds for all moves of nature whereas
holds in expected terms. In other words, outcomes negotiated by symmetrically informed parties are assumed e¢ cient.
Anticipating these equilibrium payo¤s, party A has the incentive of being informed with probability x m that maximizes her objective function (m refers to mandatory disclosure)
where A's private gain from being informed amounts to
Under mandatory disclosure, party A has the incentive of learning the true move of nature with probability
To compare these incentives with those under …rst best, it follows from the Coase Theorem (5) and (6) and from (2) and (7) that (i) If
Proof. The di¤erence w(x) f m (x) = + x ( w m ) of the two objective functions is an a¢ ne function of x with coe¢ cient
and with constant term = 0 0 . Therefore, in case (iii), the two objective functions di¤er by a constant term only from which claim (iii) follows immediately.
In case (i), the di¤erence is strongly monotonically increasing in x such that, for any x < x m ,
and, hence,
must hold. It follows, that welfare w(x) cannot attain a maximum in the range x < x m and, for that reason, claim (i) must be valid indeed.
Claim (ii) follows analogously.
Under mandatory disclosure, party A has insu¢ cient incentives to acquire information provided that 0 < E[ (!)] holds. The next proposition provides conditions under which this inequality would be met.
In the hold-up literature as pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) , parties negotiating under symmetric information are usually assumed sharing the surplus in …xed proportions and 1 which, in the present setting, means that
as well as
and, hence, Even if the surplus is not shared in …xed proportions, there exists an important class of examples where these incentives can never be excessive.
If , in the absence of information, the outside option is e¢ cient such that
holds for all moves ! 2 of nature then incentives to acquire information can neither be excessive. The following proposition summarizes these …ndings.
Proposition 2 
Voluntary disclosure
In this section, the legal regime is explored where the disclosure of information is at the discretion of party A. More precisely, the following informational setting is imposed.
If party A does not learn the true move of nature, she cannot produce any evidence at all and, hence, she necessarily has to remain silent. In particular, she cannot credibly communicate the fact that she is uninformed as hiding evidence remains always an option under voluntary disclosure.
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If, however, party A learns the true move ! of nature, she may either voluntarily disclose ! truthfully or may hide it, but she cannot reveal any untrue move of nature.
Therefore, if A discloses the (true) move ! of nature, negotiations take place under symmetric information such that the parties'equilibrium payo¤s amount to (!) and (!) as discussed in the previous section.
If, however, party A remains silent then party B does not know whether such silence is due to her having not learned the true move of nature or whether she knows the true move of nature but prefers hiding it. As a consequence, parties are asymmetrically informed whenever party A remains silent. Furthermore, let me also assume that the investment decision x of party A itself remains always hidden to party B.
In (bargaining) equilibrium, the event space will be partitioned into Under asymmetric information, the Coase Theorem need not hold. Therefore, if party A knows ! but hides it, the sum of payo¤s may not reach the maximum, i.e. for ! 2 h , only the inequality
is assumed to hold. Similarly, if party A remains silent because she does not know the move of nature, the inequality
is assumed to hold in expected terms.
Suppose party A knows the true move ! of nature but hides it. Then, in equilibrium, her payo¤ must be at least as high as if she had disclosed. i.e.
must hold for all ! 2 h . This condition will be referred to as disclosure constraint.
The remaining conditions common to equilibrium payo¤s are participation constraints. Since party A may unilaterally impose the outside option even if she does not know the true move of nature, the inequality Therefore, as party B may unilaterally impose the outside option, the participation constraint
must be met in expected terms.
Under voluntary disclosure, party A's expected payo¤ as a function of x amounts to
denotes A's private value of being informed (subscript v refers to voluntary disclosure).
In equilibrium, party A chooses a probability of being informed
which maximizes her objective function f v (x).
Given such incentives, …nally, party B's beliefs are consistent if the con-
is met.
The following proposition shows that, under voluntary disclosure, party A has excessive incentives to acquire information (relative to …rst best) quite generally, provided that party A enjoys encompassing bargaining power under symmetric information. By that I mean that her payo¤ amounts to Notice, condition (16) would, in particular, be met if party A can propose contractual terms on TIOLI-basis as assumed by Shavell (1994) and several other papers of the related literature.
Proposition 3 Suppose it is prohibitively costly for party A to learn the move of nature for sure (as, e.g., lim x!1 k(x) = 1). If, in addition, party A enjoys encompassing bargaining power under full information (i.e. (16) holds) then the following claims must be true:
(ii) Party A has excessive incentives to acquire information under voluntary disclosure but e¢ cient incentives under mandatory disclosure (i.e.
Proof. It follows from (9), (10) and party B's participation constraint (13) that
By rearranging terms, it follows that
As becoming informed for sure is prohibitively costly, p < 1 must hold in equilibrium (see (15)). Since party A has encompassing bargaining power in the sense of (16),
must hold such that claim (i) now immediately follows from the disclosure constraint (11).
To establish claim (ii), it follows from (14), (2) and (16) that
It then follows from the disclosure constraint (11) and claim (i) that v w 0 must be satis…ed.
From the encompassing bargaining power of party A, …nally, it follows
must hold, such that the proposition is fully established.
6 Notice, for convenience, I occasionally suppress ! as an argument.
Endowing the party that searches for information with encompassing bargaining power turns out to be crucial for establishing excessive incentives under voluntary disclosure. At less than full bargaining power, the result may collapse as will be shown in the next two sections.
For that purpose, I will consider two informational settings at the extreme edges to which I refer to as sel…sh and cooperative acquisition of information.
For these two settings, incentives to acquire information can be compared without specifying the bargaining procedure explicitly provided that, in the absence of information, the outside option would be e¢ cient in the sense of condition (8).
Sel…sh acquisition of information
Under sel…sh acquisition of information by party A, the informational setting is such that party B's reservation payo¤ v(!) = b remains independent of the move of nature. Moreover, to ensure party B's participation, the constraints
must hold for all moves of nature ! 2 h that party A would hide in equilibrium whereas
will be met in expected terms whenever party A remains silent because she does not know the move of nature.
To justify these properties, let me refer to the possible speci…cation of the underlying allocation problem as introduced in section 2. For this speci…cation, sel…sh acquisition of information by party A means that the move of nature directly a¤ects her own payo¤ function A(!; q) only whereas party B's payo¤ function B(q) remains independent of !. Party B's reservation value v(!) = B(o) will then also be independent of the move of nature.
Moreover, party B knows his payo¤ from any trade decision q and transfer payment t to be B(q) t and can compare it with the value of his outside option v(!) = b. In equilibrium, his payo¤ cannot be lower such that the participation constraints (17) and (18) will hold indeed under this particular speci…cation.
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In the following, exclusive use of (17) and (18) will be made such that the next proposition remains valid for other speci…cations of the allocation problem that satisfy these two constraints.
Proposition 4 (sel…sh acquisition of information) Suppose that the participation constraints (17) and (18) are met and that, in the absence of information, the outside option is e¢ cient (i.e. (8) holds). Then the following claims are valid:
(ii) Party A has insu¢ cient incentives to acquire information even under voluntary disclosure (i.e. v w ). (iii) Under mandatory disclosure, incentives are even lower (i.e. m v ).
Proof. To establish claim (i), use of the participation constraints (4), (12) and (18) will be made. Due to the Coase Theorem (6) and the constraint (10), it follows from the assumption (8) of the outside option being e¢ cient in the absence of information that the above constraints must all be binding.
In particular, the equalities
To establish claim (ii), it follows from (2), (14) and claim (i) that
and hence, from (5), (9) and claim (i), that
It now follows from claim (i) and (17) To establish claim (iii), …nally, it follows from (14), (7) and claim (i) that
and, hence, from the disclosure constraint (11) Under sel…sh acquisition of information, the intensity of incentives to acquire information can unambiguously be ranked provided that, in the absence of information, the outside option would be e¢ cient. Voluntary disclosure generates insu¢ cient but still stronger incentives than mandatory disclosure.
Recall that this ranking of the two regimes based on the intensity of incentives holds independently of details of the bargaining game.
Cooperative acquisition of information
Under cooperative acquisition of information, the equilibrium payo¤ of party A will be constant whenever she remains silent, i.e.
is assumed to hold for all moves ! of nature from the event h . Moreover, her reservation payo¤
also remains independent of the move of nature under cooperative acquisition.
To justify these conditions, I refer again to the speci…cation of the underlying allocation problem from section 2. In this speci…cation, acquisition is of cooperative nature if the information acquired by party A directly a¤ects the payo¤ function of party B only. This means that party A's payo¤ function A(q) remains una¤ected by the move of nature.
The bargaining strategy of party A who knows ! to be the true move of nature may still be di¤erent from the strategy if she does not know this move.
Yet, since party A could easily mimic these di¤erent bargaining strategies, in equilibrium, her payo¤ must be the same. Otherwise, she would always deviate to the strategy that yields the highest payo¤. For a formal derivation of condition (19), the reader may visit the appendix.
In the setting of cooperative acquisition, party A has even lower incentives to acquire information under voluntary disclosure if compared with mandatory disclosure as the following proposition establishes.
Proposition 5 (cooperative acquisition of information) Suppose that the constraints (19) and (20) are met and that, in the absence of information, the outside option is e¢ cient (i.e. (8) Proof. Due to the participation constraints (4) and the Coase Theorem To establish claim (ii), consider
which can be rearranged, using 0 = a from claim (i), to
The …rst and the last term are non-negative as follows from claim (i). The second term vanishes due to (19). Claim (ii) is established.
Claim (iii) directly follows from proposition 2.
Conclusion
Investments to acquire information prior to negotiations may fail to be contractible. As a substitute, law and courts delineate residual rights in the form of disclosure duties. Such residual rights, if anticipated, a¤ect the incentives to acquire information. The present paper has compared acquisition incentives under mandatory versus voluntary disclosure.
In general, acquisition incentives will be distorted under both regimes.
If the party that may acquire information has encompassing market power, incentives turn out to be excessive under voluntary disclosure but insu¢ cient under mandatory disclosure. As a consequence, no general results on the ranking based on welfare under the two regimes can be expected to hold.
Under less than encompassing bargaining power, even the ranking based on the intensity of incentives may become ambiguous. I have identi…ed, however, two particular informational settings where a ranking based on the intensity of acquisition incentives can be established independent of the bargaining procedure. In the setting of sel…sh acquisition of information, incentives are insu¢ cient even under voluntary disclosure whereas, under mandatory disclosure, they are even lower. In the setting of cooperative acquisition, however, it is the other way round: incentives to acquire information are lower under voluntary than mandatory disclosure. These results hold at least if, in the absence information, it would be best no to strike a deal.
Under cooperative acquisition, the rankings based on intensity of incentives and welfare coincide. In fact, under voluntary disclosure, not only incentives are lower but the negotiated outcome, due to asymmetric information, may fail to be ex post e¢ cient.
Ex post ine¢ ciency may also be the reason why, in the setting of sel…sh acquisition, the ranking based on the intensity of incentives may di¤er from the one based on welfare. While incentives to acquire information are higher under voluntary disclosure, the negotiated outcome may fail to be e¢ cient.
For this reason, distortions due to ex post ine¢ ciency may outweigh those from lesser acquisition of information. respectively. The game in normal form with A and B as strategy sets and the above payo¤ functions is played whenever party A remains silent, be it that A does not know the move of nature or that A knows ! but hides it. Furthermore, let me consider the setting of cooperative acquisition of information in which party A's payo¤ function A(q) remains independent of the move of nature. In this setting, the two optimization problems (21) and (22) are identical such that the equilibrium payo¤s (!) = E 0 must coincide as assumed in the paper. Shavell (1994) and Hermalin (2013) examine the case where an indivisible commodity is exchanged for sure and where the decision q re ‡ects an investment choice that is taken by the buyer after trade. Negotiations concern the transfer payment only which the buyer must pay to the seller. Again, equilibrium payo¤s in such a setting would satisfy all constraints imposed on them in the paper as well.
The same holds true for in…nitely repeated bargaining procedures provided that, if played under symmetric information, agreement is reached in the …rst period such that the Coase Theorem remains valid.
